This paper addresses the controversy between Mayers, Lo and Chau 1 on one side, and Yuen 2 on the opposite side, on whether there exist or not unconditionally secure protocols. For such purpose, a complete classification of all possible bit commitment protocols is given, including all possible cheating attacks. For the simplest class of protocols (non-aborting and with complete and perfect verification), it is shown how naturally a game-theoretical situation arises. For these protocols, bounds for the cheating probabilities are derived, which turn out to be different from those given in the impossibility proof 1 . The whole classification and analysis has been carried out using a finite open system approach. The discrepancy with the impossibility proof is explained on the basis of the implicit adoption of a closed system approach-equivalent to modeling the commitment as performed by two fixed machines interacting unitarily in a overall closed system. However, it is shown that the closed system approach for the classification of commitment protocols unavoidably leads to infinite dimensions, which then invalidate the continuity argument at the basis of the impossibility proof.
Introduction
It is of practical relevance to establish if there exist secure quantum bit commitment protocols, since the quantum bit commitment is a crucial element to build up more sophisticated protocols, such as remote quantum gambling, coin tossing, and unconditionally secure two-party quantum computation.
In the bit commitment Alice provides Bob with a piece of evidence that she has chosen a bit b = 0, 1 which she commits to him. Later, Alice will open the commitment, revealing the bit b to Bob, and proving that it is indeed the committed bit with the evidence in Bob's possession. Therefore, Alice and Bob should agree on a protocol which satisfies simultaneously the three requirements: (1) it must be concealing, namely Bob should not be able to retrieve b before the opening; (2) it must be binding, namely Alice should not be able to change b after the commitment; (3) it must be verifiable, namely Bob must be able to check b against the evidence in his possession, according to the rules of the protocol. In a in-principle proof of security of the commitment it is supposed that both parties possess unlimited technology, e. g. computational power, space, time, etc., and the protocol is said unconditionally secure if neither Alice nor Bob can cheat with significant probability of success as a consequence of physical laws.
In 1993, a quantum mechanical protocol was proposed 3 , and the uncondi-tional security of this protocol has been generally accepted for long time. The insecurity of this protocol was shown by Mayers, Lo and Chau 1 in 1997, where it was recognized the possibility for Alice to cheat by entangling the committed evidence with a quantum system in her possession, and it was argued that no unconditionally secure protocol is possible. Finally after 2000 Yuen 2 presented some protocols which challenged the previous impossibility proof, mostly on the basis of the possibility of encoding the bit on an anonymous state given to Alice by Bob and known only to him, and suggesting the use of decoy systems that make the protocol concealing in the limit of infinitely many systems, with the possibility for Bob of performing his quantum measurement before Alice opening, whence disputing the general availability of EPR cheating for Alice.
In this paper, in order to provide clarifications on the controversy we will present a classification of all possible bit commitment protocols based on a single commitment step, analyzing the main cheating strategies for both parties (a full derivation of the classification, the reduction of multi-step commitments to a single step, and a more exhaustive analysis of cheating attacks can be found in Ref. [4] , of which the present paper is a much shorter version). For the simplest class of protocols (non-aborting, with complete and perfect verification) we will show how naturally a game-theoretical situation arises. Bounds for the cheating probabilities of these protocols are presented, which are different from those given in the impossibility proof 1 . In the final discussion we will see how the discrepancy between the two opposite analysis arises, due to the implicit adoption in the impossibility proof of a closed system approach, equivalent to modeling the commitment as performed by two fixed machines interacting unitarily in a overall closed system. However, it is shown that such modeling, along with the requirement of unlimited technology, necessarily lead to infinite dimensions, which invalidate the continuity argument at the basis of the impossibility proof.
The classification of protocols
The most general bit commitment scheme with a single step is of the form: (1) Bob prepares the Hilbert space H with the anonymous state |ϕ ∈ H, and sends H to Alice; (2) Alice modulates the value b = 0, 1 of the committed bit on the anonymous state |ϕ and sends the output back to Bob. The bit modulation is a quantum operation (QO) M (b) parametrized by b. Such scheme contains all possibilities, including Yuen's protocols 2 , and the protocols considered by Mayers, Lo and Chau 1 , which correspond to openly known |ϕ . In general the output Hilbert space K of the QO will be different from H, since Alice can send back to Bob a quantum system different from what he sent to her.
In Ref.
[4] a complete classifications of all possible protocols is derived, on the basis of the fact that since Alice has unlimited technology, she can always achieve the encoding QO's M (b) of the committed bit value b via a perfect pure measurement. For non aborting protocols, this corresponds to the following QO's
where A is the preparation ancilla/decoy Hilbert space prepared in the state |ω ; F is the measurement ancilla Hilbert space on which Alice performs a complete von Neumann measurement, and we have that K ⊗ F ≃ H ⊗ A; P is the space of the secret parameter, say j, which is needed in order to make the protocol concealing and at the same time verifiable (so that the modulation is actually a choice between two ensembles of QO's {M j } for b = 0, 1). Therefore, the best option for Alice is to achieve the encoding QO by preparing the ancilla/decoy state |ω A ∈ A, performing the unitary transformation U (b) on H ⊗ A, making a complete von Neumann measurement on F, with outcome say i, and finally send K to Bob. The partial trace on F⊗P on the basis {|i ⊗ |j }, which describes Alice's measurement, corresponds to the Kraus decompositions
where j is the secret parameter and i is the secret outcome, and the probabilities p j = j|ρ P |j for j will depend on the preparation ρ P . In a protocol which is completely and perfectly verifiable Alice tells b, j and i to Bob, who verifies the state E (b) ji |ϕ . Since the local QO's on K and F ⊗ P commute, Alice has the possibility of: (1) first sending K to Bob; (2) then performing the measurement on F ⊗ P at the very last moment of the opening. As we will see, this is the basis for Alice EPR cheating attacks. Notice that strictly trace-decreasing QO's-i. e. aborting protocols-pose limitations to Alice's EPR cheating. In fact, Alice cannot delay the abortion of the protocol at the opening, and must declare it at the commitment. Since both secret parameters j and i can be conveniently measured by Alice, they can be treated on equal footings as a single parameter
ji ∈ B(H, K), the maps write
2)
Cheating
For a discussion of all possibilities of cheating see Ref. [4] . Here we analyze the only the useful attacks by both Alice and Bob.
Alice cheating. After the commitment and before the opening Alice can try to cheat by performing a unitary transformation V on F ⊗ P: this is the so-called EPR attack. Without changing the QO's M (b) , the maneuver will change their Kraus decompositions-which are relevant at the opening-as {E
J (V )}, keeping the cardinality, in the following way
3)
The probability that Alice can cheat successfully in pretending having committed, say, b = 1, whereas she committed b = 0 instead, is given by
and depends on the anonymous state |ϕ and on the cheating transformation V . Without any knowledge of |ϕ , the best that Alice can do is to adopt a conservative strategy, by maximizing her probability of cheating in the worst case, corresponding to the minimax choice of V
It is evident that in this way a game theoretical situation arises, in which Bob choses |ϕ and Alice choses V , with the probability P (V, ϕ) playing the role of a payoff matrix. The actual game situation is more complicated-due for example to Bob cheating-and will be analyzed elsewhere. Bob cheating. Bob can try to cheat by making the best discrimination between the two maps
j . However, since he doesn't know the probabilities p j actually used by Alice, his strategy will be suboptimal, and his actual cheating probability P B c will be lower than the probability (P B c ) opt corresponding to the optimal strategy with the right probabilities p j . Since map-discrimination is generally more reliable with the map acting locally on an entangled state 5 , instead of preparing |ϕ ∈ H Bob prepares an entangled state on H ⊗ R and sends only H to Alice. Therefore, for equally probable bit values b = 0, 1, Bob's optimal probability of cheating is bounded as follows
where ||·|| cb denotes the completely bounded (CB) norm. Bounds for cheating probabilities. If the protocol is perfectly concealing the CB-norm in Eq. (3.6) is zero, and the two maps are the same, whence the their Kraus are connected via a unitary transformation V on F ⊗ P, and Alice can cheat with probability one. Let's consider now the case in which Bob's optimal probability of cheating (P B c ) opt is infinitesimally close to
Notice that generally ε is vanishing for increasing dimension of K (such as when the approximately concealing condition is achieved for increasingly large number of decoy systems 2 ), and no obvious continuity argument can be invoked to assert that Alice cheating probability will approach unit for vanishing ε. More precisely, in the present context the continuity argument of Ref. [1] would imply that
with the function ω(ε) independent on the dimension of K. However, using anonymous states such assertion may turn out to be false. In fact, it is obvious that if there is an alternate Kraus decomposition {E (1) J } are close, then the protocol is approximately concealing and not binding, since
where for any operator A we use the customary abbreviation |A| 2 . = A † A. However, the impossibility proof would be true if a bound of the form (3.8) would be satisfied in the reverse direction, in which case one would have
which would correspond to the following continuity argument: if two CP maps are close in CB-norm, then for a given fixed Kraus decomposition for one of the two maps, there is always an alternate Kraus decomposition for the other map such that the two are close. Since as regards the cheating probabilities we have considered only the case of non-aborting protocols with perfect-verification, proving the continuity argument (3.10) or directly the bound (3.7) would means that a secure protocol can still be searched outside such class of protocols. On the other hand, finding a counterexample to Eq. (3.7) would provide a perfectly verifiable and unconditionally secure protocol.
Discussion
The discrepancy between the previous analysis and the analysis beneath the impossibility proof 1 is essentially due to the fact that the latter is based on the assumption that the starting state of the commitment protocol is openly known, in the sense that the probability distribution of the state is given, and then the corresponding mixed state can be purified. The general underlying idea is that the protocol should be processed by machines, and therefore all probability distributions are defined, and purified inside the machines. However, such an assumption is certainly not realistic for a cryptographic protocol, where each party has actually the freedom of changing or tuning the machine, namely chosing any desired probability distribution. One can continue to argue on this line, asserting that changing the machine is equivalent to use a larger machine. However, this will be equivalent to consider infinite machines, corresponding to uniform probabilities on infinite sets, and this would invalidate an impossibility proof based on a non proved continuity argument.
The above hill-posed mathematical framework arises from the Bayesian approach to secret parameters, dictated from the closed system modeling with fixed machines and purification of probabilities. Alternative to the previous approach, we have the realistic finite open system approach, in which unknown parameters are treated as such, without the need of any a priori probability distribution, in which we can address the problem for finite dimension with the parameter ε depending on it. Then, if one proceeds by treating unknown parameters as such, no openly known state can be assumed, and the anonymous state encoding of Yuen 2 leads to the present classification of protocols. Notice that if the initial state |ϕ is openly known, then for that given fixed states all QO's can be regarded as random unitary transformations (since all states are connected by unitary transformations), and this lead to the simple form of Alice cheating probability in terms of fidelities 1 , whereas in the present context the probability of cheating has the more involved form (3.4), due to the fact that the state |ϕ is unknown, and that there are QO's that don't admit random unitary Kraus decompositions.
Finally, regarding the possibility of aborting protocols, one could always reasonably adopt equivalent protocols which don't abort, since the repeated commitment will eventually be successful. However, such kind of protocols will necessarily be infinite convex combinations of protocols on infinite dimensional anonymous spaces H, and again one the closed system approach would necessarily lead to infinite dimensions.
